Hawaii Holomua, Volume II, Number 15, 5 October 1894 — THEY MEAN BUSINESS [ARTICLE]

THEY MEAN BUSINESS

Pet i njjng tbat lbe pre«ent »ar »ith Cbina is an event of tbe most nnparalleletl gravity to Jap an ainee the coantrr w»r fonnded aboot tbirty centories ago, and deeming it eesential for oor party to set forth in detail tbe reasons of its iroportance, and to point ont the oltimate objects to be aimod at in tbis connexion. tbe inerabers of tbe party living in tbe capital have agreed to tbe follo»ing declarations, eoneeming whieh they seek the approbation of tbe members of the party in otber parts of Japan: 1. Tbe soccess of tbe present j vrar with Cbina being an affair of ; paramount importance to tbe well being of tbe Empire, the nltimate 1 objects of tbe war shonld be deterrained by the people tbemselves, who should freely give e\pression to tbeir opiniona. 2. Tbougb tbe de\ails of tbe conduct of the AVar sbould be left to tbo decisioo of tbe eompetent authorities. tbo ceut*al aim of the war ahould be deter | miued by the people of tbe Em- j pire. 3. Of the various Powers iu the wor!d eapahle of being the uiūbt dangerous euemies to .lapan ia Cbiu«. nfter whieh eomo Gieat Iliilaiu, Frauco, Russia, and Germany iu tho given order. As to the otber Powers of Europe they are virtually irapoteut to exercise any serious railitary or naval power iu the East 4. Even if Jttpau were eoudnctiug a war witb a country of e»pial nuroerical strength, this country sbould devote its whole eueigies tt< the attaiuraent of a succes8ful issuo; how mueh more ahou d this be done in tbe case of a war with China, a couatry teu time« the sizo of Japau. The natiou raust recognize that sbould Jnpan destroy ber antagonist tbeu sbe beraelf will bo utterly i rninod, and the |»eople should uuite as ono inau to fare tbis tremondous issuo. .* In wagiug war tbe buge eoi ry of Chiua, who.se populatiou is counted by buudreds of millious, certaiu Japaueso are easily rejoiced by tritling victories sucb ns the defeat of t>vo or tbreo war-ships, or tbe rout of two or threo thousand soldiers Such persons, it seems, must fail to recoguize tbo gravity of the pseseut atfair aud must heuee be wautiug iu tbe resolutiou necessary to carvy it to a successful issue. G. Even if iu a hnndred battles fougbt iu Korea Japan prove victorious tbis aloue wonld uot be sufficieut io ensnre to Japau supremacy in tbe Orient. 7. To settle tbe contest decisivoly, and to eusure tbe pennanent ]>eaee of tho Orient, 5t is nooeiHary to strike a blow at tbe hcart of the euemy. Peking. 8. Sbould peaee be conclnded before the enemy had been utterly disabled by a blow in a vital part, it is needless to say tbat jCbina, spurred by tbe shame of defeat, would be wakeneil from her letbargy, and would strive by every conceivable means towreak ▼engcance on Japan. 9. Sucb a peaee, tben, wonld be oue in whieu. to guard against danger from Cbina. Japan would bave to devote all her resources to militnry aud uaval affairs, and there would be a chrouic bigb tensiou in tbe East. Nothing I would be more iojurious to tbe nation than sucb a state of affaiir. 10. In three montbs more the mouth of tbe river on whieh Tientsien is situated will freeze, ihua blocking up the pasaage iill tbe next epring. Tfaerefore it is cssential tbat Peking shoald be attacked withln tbe next lbree montbs. 11. Tbo Aostro Pmaaian war waaconcloded witbin six weeka after tbe deciaration of w«r. wiih ▼ictory oo tbe Pnmaiaa side, i ie fra^co-Qme»t inr i

■ ā . .... : 1Germanv dict%t*i teran of poxoa in Paris in le« than six month«\V«re in cirili*ed countries rē i thua c*rried on with gra»t expedition. and tbis is on tbe whole | «dvantageoas to the comb-itanta. [ !t is not extravsgant to believe tbat oor carefnlly trained so!diers ean witbin three months defeat ; tbe undisciplined levies of China, ; eveo tbougb these are fortv times tbere number. and thit terms of peaee ean tben be dictated at Peking; what is apprebended in this coonexion is that tbere may be some who, failing to «ppreci«te tbe true gravity of tbe situation, may laek t’uat beroic decigion wbicb should lead to a bold dash for Peking. 12. Tbe first step to be taken iu pnshing on to Peking would l>e to destroy or cripple tbe Chinese Northern fleet and thus to obtain a free passage into tbe Gu’.f of Peehili. Sucb details. however, may safely be left to tbe competent anthorities. and there is no necessity for ns to dwell on tbem. 13. Success in the Korean 1 Peninsalar is not only insnfficiert i to settle the drift of tbe aftair, bat jastice demands that Japan sbould as far as possible avoid makiug Korea tbe principal seat l of war. 14. Peking onee taken, tbe Chinese army in Korea would surrender at discretion, and tberefore, wbenever possible, fighting in Korea sbould be avoided. 15. A warlike spirit is an excellent tbing, but if there be uo | fixed aim in tbe war tbe warlike spirit is like an arrow fired at raudom. 16. Tbough it needless to say that to coutribute to the war fuud is a worthy and putriotic act, still the expenses required in a great war on whieh tbe very existence of the nation depends sbould be defrayed out of national Ioans or tnxes. Contribnuons ean do no more than supply a part. A few days ago the raising of a naiionai anuounced, and this step may be followed by the impositious of additional taxes; and tbe people sbonld be prepared to meet any sncb demaud made upon thern witb alacrity.